Motions in Limine - Day 3
Wednesday, May 6th, 2026
SUMMARY
The prosecution and defense met at 400 McAllister Street, Dept 604 for Day 3 of Motions in Limine.
A limited scope § 402 hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence related to law-enforcement interactions with police liaison Sara Cantor was conducted where three California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers testified to their interactions with Cantor on the bridge. This evidence was admitted by Judge Caffese. 4 pieces of evidence including videos from the April 15th, 2024 action and a February 14th, 2024 action from the Golden Gate Bridge were admitted into evidence barring proper foundation laid by the prosecution.
Notably, defense’s motion to instruct the jury on the necessity defense and admissibility of defense expert witnesses were argued in court. This was in response to the prosecution’s motion to exclude all experts the defense sought to bring into court to educate the jury. While Judge Caffese did not affirmatively rule on either, she indicated one or more of the experts sought by the defense would likely be admitted, and the admission of more witnesses would depend on the relevance of expertise established over the course of defendants' testimonies.
The prosecution’s motion to exclude all expert witnesses was granted in the following week.
DETAILED NOTES ON IN-COURT PROCEEDINGS:
1. Limited Scope 402 Hearing regarding statements made by police liaison Sara Cantor to CHP officers:
Three law-enforcement officers, Golden Gate Captain Roger Elauria, Officer Dan Langford, and Officer Tyler Carlton testified under oath.
Cantor’s Attorney Jac Lyons argued that statements attributed to others not free to leave the scene and made to defendant Cantor should not be admitted. None of the other protestors was given Miranda warnings. None was told they didn’t need to answer any of these questions. None was told these statements could be used against them in the court of law.
Judge Caffese ruled that the statements made to defendant Cantor did not qualify as custodial interrogation, hence a reading of Miranda Rights was not required, admitting the evidence to be presented to a jury.
2. Judge Caffese ruled to exclude evidence surfaced from the Meta warrant where defendant Rocky Chau liked a post recommending protestors not to engage with law enforcement. Judge Caffese ruled that ‘a like can mean many things,’ one has the freedom of association, and this evidence was too attenuated.
3. Necessity Defense and Expert Witnesses:
The DA’s office filed motions to suppress all 9 expert witnesses sought by the defense team.
Defendant Anandpura’s attorney Shaffy Moeel argued that the expert witnesses were necessary to maintain a legal standard and not a political one. She stressed the importance of the jury learning what was going on in Anandpura’s mind at the time of the protest, knowledge that could be substantiated by the testimony of the experts. Attorney Moeel added that the defense evidence should not be foreclosed before even being presented, and that each expert was selected to offer specific perspectives relevant to the conduct of the protestors and was not duplicative of the others. Additionally, Attorney Moeel noted that experts were not being called to litigate foreign policy.
Defendant Tillotson’s Attorney Anthony Gedeon stated that the experts were necessary to present a complete necessity defense.
Attorney Moeel and Attorney Gedeon further elaborated on the relevance of individual experts to the elements of the necessity defense.
Element 1: The actor acted to prevent injury to the actor or someone else
Element 2: The actor had no reasonable alternative
Element 3: The actor did not create greater danger than the danger avoided
Element 4: The actor actually believed the illegal conduct was necessary to prevent the threatened harm or evil
Element 1 of the necessity defense is to the liability of ‘unlawful activity’ where the conduct cannot be avoided and the conduct was justified to avoid more harm, determined to be more serious. The defense sought at least 2 experts to speak to this element: (1) Dr. Feroze Sidhwa, a general, trauma, and critical care surgeon from California, and a humanitarian surgeon who volunteered at the European Hospital in Khan Younis, Gaza from March 25-April 8, 2024, a week prior to the bridge protest and (2) genocide studies scholar Dr. Barry Trachtenberg who would testify that Israel's action meets indicia of genocide.
Judge Cafesse asked if the emergency had to be an emergency directly related to the defendant or close kin.
Element 2 of the necessity defense involves proving that there were no adequate legal alternatives to the conduct. In addition to the testimony of the defendants the defense pointed to the importance of testimony of former state department officials to provide independent corroboration from inside legal channels themselves. These experts have an intimate understanding of the law, how it applies to our government, and the ways in which our government was breaking our laws in its participation in the genocide in Gaza. Moeel shared with the judge that the defendants had engaged in all legal channels - and their efforts ‘bore no fruit’. Another expert, Gopal Dayaneni, would present their knowledge on the efficacy of civil disobedience, why the defendants had the reasonable belief that their act of civil disobedience would work, and the rich history of civil disobedience moving the needle of justice.
Element 3 of the necessity defense involved proving that the act did not create a greater danger than the one avoided. There seemed to be no contest in the courtroom on this element.
Element 4 of the necessity defense involved proving that the defendants actually believed that their actions were necessary to prevent further harm. The defense discussed that both subjective and objective evidence was necessary to corroborate the defendant’s testimony.
Judge Caffese asked if the defense’s position was that defendants needed to organize and participate in this unlawful protest to ‘End the War in Gaza’. Attorney Moeel responded by sharing that her client had the true subjective belief that this action was necessary to stop the genocide. To this the judge posed the hypothetical, ‘if we got rid of all Waymos, would we cure child cancer?’ Moeel responded that the subjective belief would also have an objective component to it to demonstrate the reasonableness of the belief.
Attorney Gedeon further elaborated. He shared the case of People v Scott where a person who had unknowingly ingested a hallucinogen believed they needed to steal a car to save the president. The court in that case said that because the defendant reasonably believed this, and circumstances are judged from the perspective of the person charged, that was considered a necessity. Even though the outside world knew this wasn’t true, it was reasonable in the mind of the accused.
Judge Caffese further questioned if the expert testimony was beyond the subject matter understanding of a reasonable jury. Attorney Gedeon responded affirmatively, since experts address more complex and nuanced topics, such as the legal framework of our military systems and humanitarian aid, not common knowledge. The judge pondered that some of this could be stipulated.
Attorney Moeel added that the defense was not presenting experts to have an ultimate opinion on any of the elements. Defense experts would provide relevant evidence to the jury to use to form their own opinions. Moeel continued to say that she would love to believe that Americans were more informed but it was a fact that most San Franciscans struggle to keep up with their day-to-day lives. People have been told that the ‘issue’ of Israel/Palestine is very complicated and a centuries-old debate. Specialized knowledge and expert testimony on the foundational question of emergency was necessary.
Judge Caffese observed that intent matters and what the defense is arguing is that the experts are required to understand intent. She further warned that the expertise cannot be based on speculation.
Attorney Gedeon further went on the share the case of People v Hsuing, which concluded with a recent ruling from the California Court of Appeals where the court reversed Hsuing’s conspiracy and trespass changes on account of the trial court's error of limiting the defendant’s presentation of evidence to the jury related to this tro-prong mistake of law defense. Gedeon shared that Hsuing was moved to save the animals on the farm, acting under the doctrine of the necessity of saving these animals. Hsuing did not get a fair trial because of the trial court's prejudicial error of refusing to permit the jury to consider the mistake of law defense predicated on necessity, and of excluding related evidence.
Judge Caffese pondered if the war in Gaza would stop if all of San Francisco shut down, or if all of California shut down. She emphasized that the defendants need to have an honest, good faith, and reasonable belief.
John Viola, Attorney to Defendant Ferell provided his perspective. The defendant’s actions weren’t only about the loss of life in Gaza, but also about our government’s direct involvement in the bloodshed. Attorney Viola argued that his client had the private necessity to get our government to stop sending arms to Israel and bankroll the genocide in Gaza. Attorney Viola emphasized that the genocide in Gaza is a 21st century, live-streamed mass atrocity. If this action would in any way shorten the timeline of the genocide, it was necessary.
Prosection ADA Roze raised that the People v Hsuing case might in fact support the people’s position to suppress witnesses and affirmative defenses. It provides a potential halfway to the mistake of law defense but affirms that the necessity instruction doesn’t apply.
After a short recess the court returned to session. Addressing some "housekeeping" items Judge Caffese emphasized that she will not permit anyone in her court to wear items that may influence prospective jurors and she intended on maintaining a tight courtroom.
The prosecution’s ADA Roze took the mic to address 3 areas where experts may be relevant in this case: (1) potential necessity, (2) potential mistake of law, (3) relevant to defendants' specific intent, as it related to count 1 - conspiracy charge - intent to commit a crime.
1. On experts and relevance to necessity defense:
ADA Roze conceded that she did not intend to contest the acts occurring in Gaza at the time of this incident. Whether it was a ‘legal genocide or not,’ it doesn’t change the calculus of whether there was bodily harm. ADA Roze said the prosecution would entertain some sort of stipulation to that effect, if the defense wanted to. Furthermore, because there is no contest on this, Dr. Sidhwa’s testimony won’t be relevant to the case. ADA Roze shared her belief that talking about what Dr. Sidhwa saw in Gaza would be extremely inflammatory to the jury. Dr. Tractenberg’s testimony, according to Roze, didn’t add anything to the element and could be excluded on 352 grounds as its probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial dangers of such testimony.
On Element 2 that the defendants had no reasonable alternatives ADA Roze argued that allowing former state department employees to speak to US Aid to Israel in violation of international law doesn’t get to ‘point A to B’ as the court wasn’t asking the jury to form an opinion of the US violation of its own or internal laws. This testimony would only serve to ‘confuse the issues’. ADA Roze added that she did see ‘passable relevance’ of an expert testifying on why lawful protests may not work, referring to the admission of Gopal Dayaneni’s testimony.
ADA Roze did not contest to element 3 that the harm the defendants' acts did not create greater danger than the harm it sought to avoid, however she stated that expert testimony won’t add anything to this element. On element 4 of the necessity defense, that the actors had reasonable belief that their acts would stop the harm, she believed that Gopal Dayaneni’s testimony may potentially be relevant to this.
ADA Roze concluded her thoughts on experts and relevance to the necessity defense by re-stating that she didn’t see how the court would get to necessity. Roze added that the behavior of the defendants would not stop the harm in Gaza, but acknowledged some openness to experts as long as the information coming into court wasn’t so inflammatory that it would overcome the elements. Roze said of the necessity defense, ‘I don’t see. I don’t see. I don’t see how.’
2. On experts and relevance to the Mistake of Law Defense:
ADA Roze restated the question at hand: whether the defendants have a good faith belief that what they were doing was unlawful. Roze stated her belief that none of the experts disclosed that the defendants were advised that their actions were covered by the necessity doctrine. She argued that intent in the crime is different from the actor's motives. None of the experts would testify that the intent was not to cause economic harm. Relevant to the conspiracy charge is simply to understand whether the defendants were agreeing to do an unlawful activity or a lawful activity.
3. On experts and relevance to defendant’s specific intent:
Roze further highlighted the People v Uriziceanu case where the court held that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to sell marijuana should be reversed, because the defendant was entitled to present a defense of mistake. The defendant’s good faith belief that he was not violating the law is relevant in the context of specific intent. Roze restated that Gopal Dayaneni is one expert that won’t confuse or inflame the jury.
Attorney Moeel presented her thoughts to the court.
She found the conversations productive as both parties were coming closer together in framing for the court what they believe are appropriate issues. The conversations thus far indicated to Moeel that there is some path to necessity, there should be a prima facie showing, there is clearly relevant testimony, and the core of where the court landed is that it is within the defendants' right to try to obtain the evidence to mount this defense.
Attorney Moeel agreed with ADA Roze’s assessment that the defense would have to prove the elements of necessity along the way. Moeel summarized for the court that the prosecution’s comments were illustrative that we could move forward with the experts and stipulate to, or agree to, element 1 of the necessity defense.
Attorney Moeel shared that the DA might argue that there are emergencies everywhere and this is just one of them, but it is crucial the jury understand her client’s deeply held belief that her action was necessary. Attorney Moeel did not agree that learning about the genocide would be prejudicial to the DA’s office, it was important for the jury to hear what was has been happening in Gaza, and it was important for the jury to understand the mechanics of a genocide.
Attorney Moeel emphasized that the number of experts testifying could be limited and time limits enforced - it is however crucial to allow former state department experts to testify to expose what occurred behind the scenes in our government, leaving community members such as the defendants in this case no legal avenues. Attorney Moeel was pleased to hear that the prosecution thought Gopal Dayeneni could be relevant to support as an expert on the defendant’s actual and reasonable belief for taking this action. Moeel stressed that Nora Barrows-Friendman, journalist for the Electronic Intifada, was an essential expert to present a complete defense, as she has extensively reported about what has occurred in Palestine for over a decade and a half, details of daily horrors that informed the defendant’s need to act.
Attorney Moeel closed her thoughts by sharing that the defense wanted to work alongside the court to protect the defendant’s rights to present a case in the best way possible.
Attorney Gedeon addressed the court. He reiterated that the People v Hsuing appeals judgement found the trial court prejudicially erred by finding the defense of necessity legally unavailable, and that in this case all the experts were necessary to present a full defense.
ADA Roze argued that state department employees would not be able to testify that there were no legal alternatives. She didn’t believe they were proffered in that area but it sounded like Attorney Moeel was saying those individuals had said there was no legal alternative. Defense attorney Gedeon responded to the question of how these experts would show there was no legal alternative - they would testify to what was occurring in the State department and the public opinion being ignored. Experts would testify to the violation of US laws, not international laws. Gedeon pointed to the fact that there were lawsuits against the US government to enforce their laws in the months prior to the protest.
Judge Caffese reminded Attorney Gedeon that this was not a trial for US policy in the Middle East to which Gedeon responded that this case cannot be sanitized over the government’s role in the genocide in Gaza. It is the why and it is the justification.
Judge Caffese further stated that she found it hard to believe that there were no legal alternatives - what about picketing? Judge Caffese pointed to re Eichorn 69 Cal. App. 4th 382 and People v Garziano 240 Cal. App. 3rd 241 to demonstrate where she was on the necessity defense. James Warner Eichorn was convicted of a misdemeanor criminal count in violation of a city ordinance banning sleeping in designated areas, a conviction upheld by the appellate department. In Eichorn’s case, a pretrial ruling denied Eichorn from presenting a necessity defense, barring evidence in support of the fact that on the night of the violation every shelter bed in the city of Santa Ana, available to Eichorn, was occupied, and he was unable to find work that paid him enough to pay for a place to sleep. In the Garziano abortion protest case, where appellants and their fellow demonstrators shut down a family planning clinic to prevent people from getting abortions, the court denied the invocation of the necessity defense based on the defendant’s moral convictions on the subject of abortion to justify their criminal behavior.
Judge Caffeese warned that at the moment all nine experts sought by the defense would not be permitted, as it would be too confusing for the jury. The Judge added that if the court were to allow even one expert, substantial evidence would still be required to support the court giving the jury instruction on the necessity or mistake of law defense. It would only apply if defendants were to testify, furthermore, it would only be applied to the testifying defendant, not all of them. If any of the instructions were given it would apply just to that defendant. Intent is the specific way in which testimony might be able to come in. The affirmative defenses would only apply to the conspiracy and trespass counts since the others are general intent crimes. Judge Caffese emphasized her position as the gate-keeper, adding that she did not see the necessity defense at this moment, and that the mistake of law was interesting but premature.
Attorney Gedeon re-emphasized the more recent, People v Hsuing case where if someone believes their actions were covered by necessity they were not guilty. Judge Caffese reiterated the hypothetical example of whether a necessity defense would be permitted if someone believed that shutting down Waymos would cure child cancer. Attorney Gedeon responded that if no one acted then nothing would change. Judge Caffese remarked that nothing had changed and reiterated that the experts and defenses were only relevant to the specific intent and that would be dependent on the defendants' testimonies.
Attorney John Viola offered his thoughts, sharing the metaphor of the genocide in Gaza as a fire. In this characterization, the fuel of this fire is the US aid to Israel and arms. The purpose of using the tactics and choices made by the defendants was to cut off the gasoline to the fire.
Defendant DeJesus’s attorney Katy Isa reminded the court about the low standard for allowing an affirmative defense. Attorney Isa assured the court that the defendants could testify but limiting the defense to 1 expert to prove the range of elements renders the case incomplete. The legal alternatives cited were to talk to Congress, make laws, advocate; however, the laws against the arming and bankrolling the genocide in Gaza already exist and were not upheld.
Attorney Gedeon offered that the defense could limit the experts to two. The defendants will speak to the violation of US laws by the US government but it would be important to have experts corroborate this to have a complete argument to demonstrate the lack of legal alternatives.
Attorney Viola stated that the determination of lawfulness in the unlawful assembly charge had to take into account the intention of the defendants, which was to enforce US law. Defendant Chau’s attorney EmilyRose Johns elaborated that when the emergency existed it was clear the US wasn’t complying with its own laws.
Prosecution’s ADA Roze cautioned that all of this was not a political question. She believed that if we allowed testimony on how laws were broken and how they related to the laws of other counties was beyond the scope of this case, and Leahy Laws were based on an agreement about genocide.
Judge Caffese remarked that she tended to agree with the prosecution on the point of scope. Caffese asked if the DA would bring in an expert to rebut the experts on US violation of its own laws. Caffese reminded the court that the conduct was under question and counts 1 and 12 required specific intent. The rest of the criminal counts, including false imprisonment, are general intent crimes. The defendants will have to testify and offered caution on who the defense would want to testify. Judge Cafesse closed this section of the discussion stating that illegality of US aid was beyond the purview of this case. The judge, defense, and prosecution agreed to add the list of experts to the jury questionnaire.
After this extensive discussion on affirmative defenses and experts a few assorted topics were addressed. Judge Caffese noted that even if the Meta warrant was overbroad, it was signed by the judge, hence could not be considered not in good faith. She argued that this should expected in this digital age and what was the responsibility of an investigator if not to investigate? Moeel reminded the court that while this is true, there should be adequate parameters to search warrants.
Prosection’s ADA Roze confirmed that there were no Motions in Limine outstanding and wanted to note on the record an objection to the jury questionnaire inquiry on neighborhood of residence in San Francisco, not permissible under California Code 231.7.
Attorney Gedeon requested the DA to send any social media posts, in the form of composites or powerpoints the prosecution sought to bring into evidence so the defense had an opportunity to object.
Defendant Allen’s attorney Nuha Abusamra clarified if Keffiyehs were ok in court, given their cultural significance. The judge stated on the record that she did not intend to prevent people from wearing keffiyehs in court.
Finally, Judge Caffese asked to be briefed on offers the defendants had received from the DA so far to resolve the case. At the preliminary hearing, on Oct 21st, 2024 defendants were offered to 1) plead guilty to a conspiracy charge, false imprisonment, and trespassing, all as misdemeanors and receive 2 years of court probation or 2) plead to a conspiracy charge as a felony, misdemeanor false imprisonment, misdemeanor trespassing, and receive 2 years of adult probation reducible to a misdemeanor after one year, with community service, payment of the restitution and Harvey waivers for dismissed counts. These offers were contingent on all defendants taking the offer. After the preliminary hearing the offers were updated to make the felonies nonreducible.